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The first significant smallpox epidemic in Iowa af­ter the establishment of the State Board of Health occurred in Keokuk, ironically the site of Iowa'sJ
oldest and largest medical school. This 1882 epidemic, 
which made national headlines, began when a student 
nicked himself with a scalpel drawn from a 
smallpox-infected cadaver. In all, 71 cases were reported 
to the State Board of Health, with nine confirmed deaths.
Keokuk in 1882 was better prepared than most cit­
ies to wage a war against smallpox and other pestilen­
tial diseases. Occupying a low-lying area at the 
confluence of the Mississippi and Des Moines Rivers, 
Keokuk had experience in previous decades with ma­
laria, cholera, and yellow fever epidemics that spread 
along the Mississippi River. Keokuk had a well-worn 
pest house—a small wooden shack—on the outskirts 
of town where individuals with smallpox, malaria, and 
other afflictions were isolated. Medical facilities beyond 
the ramshackle pest house were far in advance of oth­
ers in the state, with the possible exception of the re­
cently established medical department at the State Uni­
versity in Iowa City. Keokuk had a ready supply of phy­
sicians and students willing to practice their arts on the 
local inhabitants.
Smallpox broke out in town on Christmas Day, 1881. 
Keokuk had no effective local health board in place to 
deal with this epidemic, although the municipal code 
charged the mayor and council with the responsibility. 
This was not unusual. Keokuk had no board during the 
devastating cholera epidemic of 1876, or during the re­
current smallpox epidemics of 1862-1864.
Hastily, then, a local board of health was formed of 
city officials, trustees, and physicians to issue procla­
mations quarantining all those suspected of exposure 
to the disease. At the same time, two local newspapers, 
the Keokuk Constitution and the Weekly Gate-City, were 
enlisted to salvage the city's image and economy.
Efforts of the Keokuk board came too late for the 
afflicted, although its promotion of vaccination certainly 
protected many. The board's first action—closing the 
medical college where the disease originated—back­
fired. Since none of the students and faculty at the insti­
tution lived in on-site dormitories, the gesture was
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Photos of smallpox in State 
Board of Health publications 
helped doctors distinguish it 
from chickenpox and other 
similar-looking diseases.
meaningless as a quaran­
tine strategy. In fact, 
school closure provided 
the excuse for "a stam­
pede of the students" to 
their homes in the tri-state 
area. Towns across the re­
gion bashed the Keokuk 
board in the press for its
inability to control the epidemic. The city council of the 
town of Warsaw, only five miles from Keokuk, warned 
its residents to "abstain from all communication with 
said city of Keokuk," and recommended that local hotels 
turn away all "strangers or visitors" for the duration.
The board's vaccination efforts began with local 
schools, and by January 16 the Keokuk Constitution re­
ported that "the little pretty white arms [of students] 
were scratched and mutilated in wholesale numbers." 
The board also assigned a physician to go house to house 
in each of four districts in the city seeking voluntary 
vaccinations. They encountered unexpected public re­
sistance. "I s'pose you've come to vaccinate us," one 
woman was quoted as saying, "And ye might jest as 
well go away agin, for we won't have it." At one house 
a "colored brother" refused vaccination because, accord­
ing to him, a relative who had been vaccinated in Geor­
gia died one month later from the measles, so none of 
his family was ever going to be vaccinated. At another 
house a young girl declined vaccination for her broth­
ers and sisters, saying, "The folks was all away from 
home, sir, besides, they was all vaccinated last year, and 
we had the small-pox when we lived in Missouri!" Oth­
ers argued that American rights to freedom and inde­
pendence implied the right to refuse vaccination.
In response to such resistance, the board demanded 
that the public give vaccinators "courteous treatment" and 
allow them to "enter into the work of vaccination at 
once" as they were "using none other than bovine (ani­
mal) virus of the purest quality." Although no penalties 
were drawn up for noncompliance, the majority of Keo­
kuk's population had been vaccinated or revaccinated 
by the end of February. "The common remark now is, 
'don't touch my sore arm,'" reported the Constitution.
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Efforts by the local board to promote vaccination 
and quarantine were further hampered when the medi­
cal college's officials insisted on reopening the school 
immediately and local businessmen sought to minimize 
the impact on trade. The competing factions eventually 
reached a compromise, and following a thorough dis­
infection of the dissecting laboratory, the school reopened.
In the wake of the epidemic, Keokuk citizens wanted 
to snatch their economic chestnuts from the fire. As long 
as there were reminders that smallpox raged in the city, 
business would remain stagnant, as rural farmers, pur­
veyors of merchandise, and river traffickers refused to 
enter town. "The hotel registers begin to tell of the ef­
fect the small-pox scare in this city is having on the out­
side world," reported the Constitution. "The arrivals now 
are about one-third the usual number." Worries about 
potential loss of income caused the local press to begin 
noting instances of unfair quarantining against Keokuk.
Within a week of the first smallpox deaths, the New 
York Times published a report of the "ravages of small­
pox" afflicting Keokuk. Local health board president D. B. 
Hillis responded, "There is a limited number of cases 
confined entirely to medical students, and there is as 
yet no assured tendency to spread among citizens out­
side." The local press attempted to reeducate misin­
formed individuals who accepted unconfirmed stories 
as fact or who wrongly condemned the local board's 
efforts. "All kinds of wild and unfounded rumors still 
continue to exist," wrote the editor of the Constitution 
two weeks into the siege, "the generally accepted one 
outside of the city being that there are forty cases when 
there are only about ten."
Whatever response was to be made to the epidemic 
had to come from local sources; the State Board of Health 
offered no help. The state board instead spent most of 
the first three years of its existence setting up a rudi­
mentary system of gathering information. It took two 
years alone to collect incomplete statistics on births, 
deaths, and marriages from Iowa's ninety-nine coun­
ties for the single year of 1880. Later, use of telegraphy 
greatly enhanced the board's ability to collect data 
speedily, especially after it instructed county clerks to 
charge all communications to the board. But Keokuk 
officials handling the smallpox epidemic of 1881-1882 
could not legitimize their efforts by appealing to a more 
objective outside body, nor did they wish to.
W ithin five years, local authorities did begin us­ing such a resource, as they drew expertise from a state board devoted to promoting public health. Remittent importations of smallpox into 
rural Worth County from 1886 to 1904 illustrate how 
local boards gradually yielded authority to the state
board. The local response also suggests that citizens 
perceived in the outbreaks an outside threat to their way 
of life. Many times over the years, new immigrants and 
travelers imported smallpox epidemics into this rural 
community. At irregular intervals, dozens of people fell 
ill from the disease, and a few lost their lives.
Two smallpox epidemics in particular are signifi­
cant in describing disease fighting by both the local 
Worth County boards and the state board. In response 
to a new local code requiring that the state board be 
notified of all epidemic diseases and noxious hazards, 
both physician D. S. More of Northwood and the clerk 
of rural Barton Township in eastern Worth County re­
ported in July 1886 "a number of persons exposed" to 
the contagion by a recently arrived German immigrant 
family. In December 1899 a separate epidemic began, 
which authorities traced to a street carnival in Albert 
Lea, Minnesota. One of the fair-goers, it was reported, 
was "allowed to go about at large in Northwood, with 
a small-pox rash broken out on his face and all over his 
body for nearly forty-eight hours."
Resistance from within the German-born popula­
tion to measures taken by local officials justified the state 
board's decision to step in and attempt to reestablish 
order during the 1886 epidemic. In response to reports 
from local officials, the state board had wired the Barton 
Township clerk to "establish vigorous quarantine of all 
small-pox cases and exposed persons, and order and 
enforce general vaccination, to prevent spread of dis­
ease, and obey rules of State Board." The same day the 
Barton Township Board of Trustees wired back that all
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efforts to secure compliance had been thwarted by a 
popular challenge to their authority, and they did not 
know how to deal with the "ten or fifteen exposed per­
sons [who] refuse to obey trustees." The Worth County 
Index recounted in its first story on the epidemic in Bar­
ton Township, "The local board quarantined the Dietrick 
and Brown families [where the smallpox had first 
erupted], but were powerless to enforce their orders, 
and the German minister of Grafton, as well as many of 
the neighbors visited the sick daily and insisted that it 
was not the small pox and there was nothing to fear."
At that point the state board and the county sheriff 
were called in. The secretary of the state board reported 
that local officials manifested "an earnest desire . . .  to 
do all that was necessary to get rid of the scourge, but 
they did not know what to do. They were further em­
barrassed by the interference of pretended physicians 
who pronounced the disease not smallpox, and advised 
resistance to all orders of the local board." Compound­
ing the problems, the doctor hired to vaccinate county 
residents skipped town and was not heard from for 
many weeks thereafter. Another doctor hired by the state 
board to treat smallpox cases in Barton Township was 
not allowed to return to his office in Northwood for fear 
that he "would not know enough to properly disinfect 
himself before leaving the infected houses."
Under increasing pressure from the state board, lo­
cal officials began arresting and prosecuting those who 
refused to obey the quarantine. Two members of the 
Dietrick family were fined twenty-five dollars each, 
while a similar case was remitted on the grounds that 
the defendant was "a Dane who recently arrived in this 
country and he was not sufficiently acquainted with the 
language to understand that the town trustees had pro­
vided means for furnishing all necessary supplies to the 
parties who were quarantined." Clearly, the Index re­
ported, township officials had shown that they "don't 
propose being trifled with."
In 1899 rumors of a renewed outbreak of disease 
abounded in Worth County. According to attending 
physician J. Herbert Darey, "cries of 'Cuban itch,' 'Phil­
ippine itch,' 'chickenpox,' 'ruin the holiday trade,' etc. 
were heard on all hands, till the mayor, at the insistence 
of a number of the leading citizens, did what I requested 
him to do on the start, viz:—request the State Board of 
Health to send an expert to Northwood, to see if it was 
really smallpox or not." State Board President J. C.
Schrader arrived from Iowa City in short order and con-
«/
eluded that the cases in question were indeed small­
pox, though of an attenuated form. Resistance to vacci­
nation efforts in Silver Lake Township were also over­
come when reports of the malady mailed to the board 
in Des Moines returned with a commandment to quar­
antine for fear of smallpox.
This time the state board directed most of the ac­
tions of local health boards. While aiding in the writing 
of an extensive code concerning public health in 
Northwood, the state board directly implemented quar­
antine and preventative measures. The board also en­
couraged county mayors and aldermen to exercise their 
right to create local boards of health where there were 
none. Local boards were also instructed in the disinfec­
tion of homes and were legally empowered to remove 
a "sick or infected person to a separate house, if it can 
be done without damage to his health, and [to provide] 
nurses and other assistance and supplies, which shall 
be charged to the person himself, his parents or other 
person who may be liable for his support, if able; other­
wise at the expense of the county to which he belongs." 
In turn, local authorities drew up a new Northwood 
ordinance, which included more than thirty sections 
concerning disease control, burials, and penalties for de­
fiance. Finally, a state law passed in 1897 enabled the 
local Worth County boards to arrest those inoculating 
with smallpox—which unlike cowpox vaccination 
makes the individual a carrier of the disease—or know­
ingly using public transportation while infected.
The Index itself served to defuse panic as the small­
pox advanced, dispelling wild speculation and provid­
ing constructive information. "You are in no danger of 
catching smallpox by long distance telephone."
A lthough officials in Worth County relied heavily on the authority of the state board of health, the limits of the board's intervention were ap­parent even at the turn of the century. Those limits are 
demonstrated in a smallpox epidemic that affected a 
wide area of southwest Iowa and eastern Nebraska in 
1898-1899. The Fremont Democrat portrayed a county 
under siege by an invisible invader that threatened the 
economic life of the city. Blame for the debacle was 
placed squarely on its neighbor across the Missouri 
River, Nebraska City, where smallpox had gotten com­
pletely out of control. This epidemic revealed most strik­
ingly the inability of the local Fremont County boards 
to control what had become an interstate problem.
The State Board of Health did offer its encourage­
ment and limited support as the epidemic threatened 
to engulf the state. By the late 1890s, the board was 
waging war against disease on a number of fronts. It 
was, for example, encouraging improvements in sani­
tary and water systems and the development of a new 
diphtheria vaccine. Epidemic outbreaks were reported 
by wire directly to the board offices in Des Moines, then 
transmitted to health officials and appointed district 
officials who could benefit from the knowledge. Dur­
ing the smallpox epidemic of 1898, the city clerk of Ham-
Summer 2005 63
M ■
burg and local boards of health remained in constant 
contact with the state board. The state board had of­
fered indirect support to local communities since the 
mid-1880s, but asserted vehemently that its advice was 
"given for the benefit of local boards that they may more 
fully understand their duty in the premises, and the ne­
cessity for prompt and vigilant action." Thus, local 
boards were charged with ultimate responsibility for 
ending smallpox incursions. Educated by the state 
board, they were to prepare carefully for epidemics and 
act judiciously when they struck.
The Fremont County epidemic began in 
mid-November 1898, when Mrs. Samuel Townsend re­
turned from a visit to a married daughter in Nebraska 
City who was sick with an "eruptive fever, but not well 
defined." Although Mrs. Townsend was only mildly af­
fected herself, her family was quickly and seriously in­
fected. On November 18 the city clerk telegraphed the 
state board to report the outbreak. He noted that the 
mayor had appointed four police to guard the Townsend 
residence. The same afternoon, local physician W. L. 
Bogan wired the state board to ask what additional steps 
should be taken to stem the spread of the smallpox.
The next day Hamburg's local press, the Fremont 
Democrat, began reporting the course of the epidemic 
as it spread outward from the Townsend family and 
from a felled contract laborer home from Nebraska City. 
The Democrat praised the mayor and town physicians 
for their quick reaction to the disease and the subse­
quent quarantine. The paper noted with concern, how­
ever, that another of Mrs. Townsend's daughters had 
continued to attend public school, much to the conster­
nation of the teachers and pupils. Further infection ar­
rived by steady communication across the railroad 
trestle bridging the Missouri. "We have quarantined 
against Nebraska City, Neb., but we are unable to place 
a quarantine at the bridge," lamented the city clerk in a 
communication to the state board.
As alarm spread, other Fremont County communi­
ties began to request the state board to step in and es­
tablish a more secure quarantine against Nebraska City. 
J. A. Armstrong, Percival's mayor and de facto local 
health board president, requested that the state board 
draft men to guard the bridge spanning the Missouri. 
"A great many people are daily passing from Iowa into 
Nebraska City for the purpose of trading," wrote the 
mayor. "Consequently, we are very anxious to have 
guards stationed there." Strict quarantine "would have 
been done before now if our local board had understood 
the necessary steps in the proceeding. . . . We shall be 
very glad to have you take active measures at once."
Pleas received from officials in Hamburg, Percival, 
and rural Fremont County townships prompted the 
state board to send [Board of Health] district physician
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“A Simple Method Whereby a Physician May Properly Pre­
pare Himself to Visit a Home Where a Contagious Disease 
Exists” ( Iowa Health  Bullet in supplement, July 191 I).
Dr. McKlveen to report on the situation first hand and 
explain to local boards the principles of restricting small­
pox. The task was more formidable than either the state 
board or McKlveen had anticipated. Not only would 
they have to quarantine the railroad and wagon bridge 
that connected Nebraska City with Iowa, but also miles 
of the riverbank as well, "as the river is frozen over and 
persons can cross on the ice."
One of McKlveen's most important duties was to 
disseminate information concerning the prevention of 
smallpox. As the disease continued into the spring, in­
struction provided by McKlveen encouraged vaccina­
tion and disinfection. McKlveen suggested that all struc­
tures containing smallpox patients be thoroughly fu­
migated, and the board issued a pamphlet recommend­
ing the best means. Their advice was followed through­
out the county. When two fresh cases of smallpox ap­
peared in Hamburg in May 1899, for example, a local 
doctor wrote that "all doubtful clothing, bedding and 
draperies were burned. . . .  I had the stable and the
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horses disinfected, also the privy vault, by using a so­
lution of sulphate of iron and carbolic acid. I had the 
yard raked and rubbish burned, then had the yard and 
walks sprayed with solution of sulphate of iron." More­
over, Bogan "had the parties all bathed, then washed in 
a solution of carbolic acid and dressed in clean cloth­
ing. I had each room fumigated with sulphur, cooled 
them off, and then used formaldehyde for six hours, 
opened the appartments [sic] and thoroughly ventilated 
them, and moved the family in; considering there was 
no more danger." Although it is doubtful that any of 
these techniques worked, they do illustrate the degree 
to which local boards responded to the state board's 
authority.
Persons exposed to smallpox in Nebraska City were 
in Hamburg nearly every day, and many cases undoubt­
edly went unreported for fear of inviting quarantine at 
home or in a drafty building outside the city limits. Town 
leaders quarantined against Nebraska City reluctantly, 
hoping that this time the health board's edict would be 
obeyed.
Nebraska City citizens, in their turn, believed that 
the epidemic had started among the more than 2.5 million 
people who attended the Trans-Missouri Exposition 
held between June 1 and October 31,1898, in Omaha.
The Hamburg-Nebraska City epidemic of 1898- 1899 probably arrived via a Missouri River steamboat. There was, however, an even more disquieting way for smallpox to enter the state. Iowa's 
Board of Health recognized that passenger rail travel, 
and especially the immigrants aboard the trains, car­
ried the potential to spread disease. The board docu­
mented cases of immigrants, travelers, or hobos infect­
ing Iowa communities. Many articles in the public health 
journals and newspapers of the period lamented the 
double-edged sword of railroads and disease. The sec­
retary of Iowa's board worried about the lack of control 
over this moving menace. "A great deal is being said 
about the commercial value of railroads," he noted, "and 
yet they have a sanitary value hardly less important." 
As local Iowa communities drew life-blood from rail­
roads that had given birth to them, so also did they suf­
fer from the railroads' occasionally deadly cargo. Rural 
towns were much less likely to refuse trains than for 
railroad companies to refuse service to towns suffering 
localized epidemics. The state board made numerous 
attempts to reduce the risk, but most were imperfect, ill 
conceived, or simply not in the best interests of the rail­
roads. Still, encouraged by state and national boards of 
health, the railroads made efforts to vaccinate employ­
ees, disinfect passenger cars, and selectively forbid pas­
sage to those with obvious cases of disease.
The increasing number of smallpox cases in Chi­
cago had prompted a special meeting of the Chicago 
Board of Health and other midwestern health boards. 
Conferees at this Chicago Smallpox Conference in 1881 
included Iowa State Board Secretary R. J. Farquharson. 
"In view of the fact of the frequent introduction of 
small-pox into the interior of Iowa from immigrants," 
said Secretary Farquharson, "the Iowa State Board of 
Health would respectfully request the National Board 
of Health to secure the vaccination of all unprotected 
immigrants before they leave the ports of arrival in this 
country." Some conferees denounced the feeble efforts 
made by eastern ports to prevent diseases from propa­
gating. Others complained that midwestern termini 
were becoming dumping grounds for sick immigrants.
The Chicago Smallpox Conference and the pleas of 
midwestern public health authorities drew a response 
from the recently created National Board of Health, 
which created a special Immigration Inspection Service 
in June 1882 to check railroads, ocean steamers, and river 
transport for disease. Doctors were hired across the na­
tion to inspect and vaccinate immigrants and travelers. 
From the start, though, the Immigration Inspection Ser­
vice was ineffective in stemming the flow of disease 
across the Atlantic and from east to west. Inadequate 
numbers of inspectors were overwhelmed by the task.
The Immigration Inspection Service had little im­
mediate impact, but its existence had important ramifi­
cations. It contributed to the sense that "every organized 
community should be provided with a competent board 
of health, and the State with a State Board, supplied with 
every requisite for aiding and directing the local authori­
ties in their sanitary work." More importantly, though, 
for a short time the Immigration Inspection Service was 
a visible reminder that disease was more than a local 
phenomenon, one that demanded coordinated efforts, 
and it provided a national forum for discussing ways 
to combat the health problems related to integrated, glo­
bal transportation systems. In 1883, as the service was 
being phased out due to budget cuts and political in­
fighting, sixteen local and state boards, including Iowa's, 
submitted a blanket recommendation to the National 
Board pleading for its continuation. These boards noted 
that "this inspection service is such that its benefits have 
no relation to State boundaries, but its protective influ­
ences extend widely throughout this country; conse­
quently, expenses therefore should not properly be 
borne by any local or State board of health."
Although state veterinary surgeons had drawn up 
lengthy regulations to certify the health of cattle com­
ing from areas where disease was plentiful, few similar 
laws were on the books for humans until the 1890s. The 
Immigration Inspection Service and the Iowa State 
Board of Health spurred Iowa rail companies to detain
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passengers who had obvious symptoms of smallpox, 
were incapacitated by dysentery, or were suffering from 
undiagnosed fevers. Iowa railroad stationmasters re­
sponded by disinfecting passenger cars just prior to their 
use. General Manager Marvin Hughitt of the Chicago 
& North Western Railway Company ordered his em­
ployees and officers to inspect "passenger coaches, and 
especially those used for the transportation of seaboard 
emigrants" and make sure they were "thoroughly 
cleaned throughout" after every run. In 1894 manage­
ment for the Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railway 
issued a circular making it the "duty of conductors to 
report by wire to their superintendents and the secre­
tary of the State Board of Health any person on their 
train suspected of having small pox or cholera." Sta­
tion agents were to report to the local board of health 
the arrival of all immigrants so that the board could in­
spect the immigrants and their baggage. Still, economic 
concerns prevented the national and state boards from 
demanding reform from railroad companies.
The Chicago & North Western Railway epidemic of 
June 1889 provides an example of the rail-borne vector 
for smallpox in Iowa. The epidemic spread virtually 
from one end of the state to the other, although only 
two exposed individuals died. Imported among Ger­
man immigrants aboard a crowded passenger train, 
smallpox pustules were apparent on the face of one 
immigrant as the train entered the state. Nevertheless, 
no action was taken until stations along the route be­
gan complaining by telegraph to the state board. 
Clinton, Marshalltown, Nevada, Boone, and Jefferson 
each charged that smallpox had made its appearance in 
their communities coincidentally with the arrival of the 
train, leaving sickness in its tracks. Apparently, none of 
the station managers bothered to wire ahead and spare 
the next town. When the state board requested that ex­
posed passengers be taken into protective custody, the 
mayor of Wall Lake in Sac County refused, saying that 
the board had to remove them from the community. The 
train was then sent on its way. At Galva, obstructions 
placed on the tracks forced the train to stop. The train 
was then moved onto a siding, and state board physi­
cian J. D. Miller quarantined the passengers and crew. 
The caboose in which the infected passenger had been 
riding was dragged to an Ida County gravel pit, where 
it was disinfected and abandoned. Regarding such prob­
lems as this, Secretary Farquharson was prompted to 
write, "Something more is required than the inspection 
and vaccination of passengers." Farquharson advocated 
the total isolation of immigrants on their journeys, sealed 
in their own cars as they crossed the state.
Finally, in 1891 Congress ruled that immigrants were 
to be screened both for pestilential diseases and epilepsy 
as well as for their moral character. That legislation did
not remove the immigrant vector for disease, but it did 
lessen it substantially. The widening scope of activity 
by the United States Public Health Service also limited 
the extraterritorial introduction of disease into Iowa and 
the nation. Facilities for quarantine of vessels were con­
structed at significant points of entry each year until 
detention stations were in operation at every major sea­
port and border crossing in the nation.
Concern about smallpox slowly weakened as the turn of the century approached, not because of the activities of health organizations, but be­
cause V. minor replaced V. major as the main type of in­
fection. Mild cases of the disease were already present 
in Iowa by the 1880s and were often confused with 
chickenpox. Still, they could elicit panic. Des Moines 
adopted a siege mentality when two young boys and 
three girls in two families were incorrectly identified as 
exhibiting smallpox in 1892. Although the children be­
gan recovering within the week, the physician employed 
by the board of health to attend the children "stoutly 
maintained that the disease was small pox and urged 
the board not to release the quarantine." Three more 
weeks passed before the quarantine was lifted. "It seems 
incredible," state board physician E. H. Carter wrote 
later, "that in the city of Des Moines, two families should 
have been taken from their homes, placed in a pest 
house, guarded by officers and kept there for nearly a 
month during the development of six or eight well 
marked cases of chicken pox."
By the turn of the century, the changing nature of 
smallpox had a similar effect on the state board's ap­
proach to the disease. Instead of stressing its mortal ef­
fect, the board issued posters and other pamphlet ma­
terial designed to portray those who refused vaccina­
tion as uneducated, and those who suffered the disease 
as threats to society.
In the preceding decades the Iowa State Board of 
Health had added a new voice to the debate over the 
relationship between epidemic disease, immigrants, and 
the marketplace. However, the board could do little to 
prevent the further spread of smallpox but share its 
expertise and lend its authority to encouraging the use 
of the cowpox vaccine and the quarantine of exposed 
persons. ❖
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